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THE FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE OF
JUDGE JACK B. WEINSTEIN
Anita Bernstein*
INTRODUCTION
The comedian Sam Levenson, a near-contemporary of our honoree,
once said that “[i]f you ever need a helping hand,” you can always find
one:  Just check “the end of your arm.”1 Desiring feminist decisional
law, legal scholars turned to the same ever-helpful nearby source.
Their project, launched at a wine-and-dinner table in Toronto in
2004,2 set out to write new versions of published judicial decisions that
had disappointed them.  They planned a revisionist corpus that would
show readers “what substantive equality [could] look like.”3
Take for example a decision allowing the government of Newfound-
land to renege on an obligation it had negotiated.  Financial exigency
in the province permitted the breach of a promise to give female em-
ployees $24 million in pay equity adjustments, the Supreme Court of
Canada said in response to a protest that the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms forbids sex discrimination in the public sector.4
Two years later, a fictitious tribunal called the Women’s Court of Ca-
nada purported to undo this outcome:  “[F]iscal considerations should
never suffice as a pressing and substantial basis for overriding equality
rights,” it declared.5 Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E.
joined five other decisions of the Women’s Court of Canada in a spe-
cial issue of a law journal.6
* Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Kol hakavod to the
Judge.  Thanks to Jacob Corre´, Liz Schneider, and Deborah Widiss for their answers to my ques-
tions, and to Jamie Maguire for research assistance that included brainstorming on methods.
1. SAM LEVENSON, IN ONE ERA AND OUT THE OTHER 1 (1973).  Levenson was born less than
a decade before Judge Weinstein but has been deceased for thirty-four years. Humorist Sam
Levenson Dies, NEWS & COURIER, Aug. 29, 1980, at 13-A.
2. Diana Majury, Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada, 18 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 1,
1 (2006).
3. Id. at 2.
4. Jennifer Koshan, Judgments, Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., 18 CANADIAN J.
WOMEN & L. 321, 327 (2006). The nonfictitious decision is Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v.
N.A.P.E, 2004 SCC 66, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 (Can.).
5. Koshan, supra note 4, at 359.  Professor Koshan, author of the fictitious decision, teaches at
the University of Calgary Faculty of Law.
6. 18 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2006).
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The initiative soon moved across the seas to Ireland, Australia, the
United Kingdom, and other jurisdictions.  It remains active, recently
taking root in United States soil.7  As explained by three of its U.K.
participants, the Feminist Judgments Project seeks to “put theory into
practice in judgment form, by writing the ‘missing’ feminist judgments
in key cases.”8  Sometimes, as in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v.
N.A.P.E., a feminist judgment will reverse an offending decision.
Other feminist-revisionist decisional law takes the form of concurring
or dissenting opinions.9  Reminiscent of Levenson’s quip, the editors
of Feminist Judgments say that, “impatient with the glacial progress
made to date,” they have decided “quite literally to take the law into
[their] own hands.”10
Sam Levenson may have had a follow-up, less amusing than his first
remark but more pertinent to this Article.  The helping hand we need
is at the end of our arm, true: but we also “have another hand,” Lev-
enson has been quoted as saying.  “The first is to help yourself, the
second is to help others.”11  In that spirit, I present what I identify as
the feminist jurisprudence of Judge Jack B. Weinstein, a person who
had no direct stake in the outcomes he crafted.  What he built and
achieved helped others.
The achievement did not originate in an agenda.  As far as I know,
Judge Weinstein never undertook to write anything feminist in a self-
conscious or overtly ideological mode,12 and so the working definition
of “feminist jurisprudence” in this Article emerges only inductively,
7. Announcing New Book Project: Feminist Judgments—US Supreme Court Edition, FEMINIST
L. PROFESSORS (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2014/02/announcing-new-
book-project-feminist-judgments-supreme-court-edition/.
8. Book Details: Feminist Judgments, HART PUBLISHING, http://www.hartpub.co.uk/books/
details.asp?isbn=9781849460538 (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
9. Renee A. Pistone, Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice, 21 L. & POLITICS BK.
REV. 715, 715 (2012) (book review), available at http://www.lpbr.net/2012/01/feminist-judgments-
from-theory-to.html.
10. Id. at 716 (quoting FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 8 (Rosemary
Hunter et al. eds., 2010)).
11. The not-so-funny injunction to “help others” appears nowhere in my copy of In One Era,
but some attribute it to Levenson. See Reaching Out to Others: It’s What We Do Here, SPEC-
TRUM, Nov. 21, 2012, at C.  Snopes.com purports to correct the misattribution of these words to
Audrey Hepburn, saying that Sam Levenson was the true writer. My Fair Lady, SNOPES.COM
(May 24, 2012), http://www.snopes.com/glurge/beautytips.asp.  Because nobody cites an actual
source and the rendering of the words varies, I doubt Levenson ever took the postscript seri-
ously enough to publish it.  He probably did have occasions to speak it, such as homilies with
children in the audience.
12. When I gave the Judge a call to tell him about this project, he was gracious and a little
bemused.  “The ideology?  The ideology is the individual without the capacity to get her rights
gets her due,” he said.  “She should be able to look to the courts to get her protection.”  Tele-
phone Interview with Jack B. Weinstein (Feb. 20, 2014).
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with reference to a long record.  A thoughtful judge reached the best
decisions he could.  In this process he happened to create, among
many other things, feminist jurisprudence.  His corpus of decisional
law responds to a priority that feminist legal theorist Catharine Mac-
Kinnon emphasized by quoting John Stuart Mill:  Reformers must
“end the aristocracy of sex.”13
Emulating the architecture of Judge Weinstein’s judicial opinions
(probably because I write as a former law clerk), this Article surveys
the corpus by classifying cases as “Law,” in Part II, and then in Part
III moves to what Judge Weinstein in his decisions likes to call “appli-
cation of law to facts”—here, “Applications and Inferences.”14  The
survey of this Article claims that feminist jurisprudence can emerge
and make important improvements without an ideology so labeled.15
II. LAW
A. Women of Low Income
One decision that may qualify as Judge Weinstein’s first work of
feminist jurisprudence invalidated a welfare regulation.16  New York
City policy automatically reduced the stipend of any woman who had
a man living in her home—by irrebuttable presumption, whether he
made any contribution or not.  “The poor do not necessarily cohabit
on a bed of roses,” Weinstein wrote for a three-judge trial court panel,
surveying the distress that the reduction in Rose Hurley’s shelter al-
lowance from $150 to $115 a month would occasion.17
What may have looked to prosperous rule writers like extra space in
an apartment being rented under the table for gain looked to Judge
Weinstein like another tough tradeoff in a hard life.  He quoted expert
testimony from the Columbia University sociologist Herbert Gans:
13. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, at vi (2001); see also Katharine T. Bartlett,
MacKinnon’s Feminism: Power on Whose Terms?, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1559, 1570 (1987) (review-
ing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987), and adverting to “the undoing of our system of gender-based oppression”).
14. Regrettably, I have not mastered the Judge’s technique of writing expository prose with-
out footnotes, see JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE BENCH:  THE CRAFT AND ACTIVISM
OF JACK WEINSTEIN 91 (2011), and so cannot replicate it here.  Judge Weinstein does include
heavy footnotes in his academic writing. Id. at n.15.  Maybe I am hewing to his methods after all.
15. Cf. Louisa Peacock, Tony Benn: What He Achieved for Women, TELEGRAPH  (Mar. 14,
2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-politics/10697433/Tony-Benn-the-
feminist-What-he-achieved-for-women.html (giving similar attention to the accomplishments of
another contemporary of Judge Weinstein’s).
16. Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. 1974). But see infra notes
160–164 and accompanying text (suggesting that a 1968 decision by the Judge may also qualify as
feminist jurisprudence).
17. Id. at 171.
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[W]here there is poverty and insecurity people get very depen-
dent on each other to tide them over during crises, so that you have,
and this has been found in studies all over the world among poor
people . . . [,] a very generous extension of help and hospitality to
others, relatives and close friends.
And this exists not because poor people are necessarily more al-
truistic or more generous than other people, but because this is re-
ally the only way you can survive in a crisis. If you don’t have
somebody who you can rely on to bail you out with a couple of
dollars to get you to the hospital, if one of your kids suddenly gets
sick, to provide you a room if your landlord evicts you or if your
building burns down or becomes uninhabitable, if this ability to call
on somebody for help is not available, then survival for the poor is
much more risky. And so what happens is you get a pattern of mu-
tual help, of mutual obligations, people helping each other because
they know if they help somebody when they have a problem, they
will be helped in return.
One part of this helping phenomenon is people making room in
their house for somebody who is in need of shelter temporarily or
permanently, and again only in this case on the grounds that if I
don’t do it for him or her now, he won’t do it for me when I am
faced with that problem.18
“This is a very important phenomenon that middle class people don’t
do much of and don’t understand,” Weinstein emphasized, continuing
his quotation of Gans.19
Hurley went on to rebut what New York had deemed irrebuttable.
The presence of a “lodger” does not demonstrate that a family has
more space than it needs, Judge Weinstein found.20  Moreover, not all
men who take up residence in apartments deliver financial advantage
to the female welfare recipients who live there.21  Although a divided
Second Circuit panel disagreed,22 Weinstein’s reading of the New
York welfare rules went on to prevail in the United States Supreme
Court.23
In United States v. Leasehold Interest in 211 Nostrand Ave., Apart-
ment 1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y.,24 Judge Weinstein blocked part of an evic-
tion from a housing project in Williamsburg.  The drug dealers in the
household had to get out, he decided—he wrote an injunction to that
18. Id. at 172 (alterations in original).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 173.
21. Id. at 174–75.  For a book-length exposition of this thesis, see KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA
KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE
(2005).
22. Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974).
23. Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975).
24. 760 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
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effect—but a fifty-one-year-old great-grandmother could stay.25  She
had no other place to go, and Weinstein found credible her statement
that she did not know her nineteen-year-old granddaughter was sell-
ing crack.26  He later told an interviewer that “the only hope of saving
the largest part of the group was in saving the apartment and the
[great-]grandmother’s control of the children.”27
A more famous set of feminist decisions by the Judge, known in the
aggregate as Nicholson,28 addressed low-income women less directly.
The women made better off by it have been overwhelmingly poor,
however.29 Nicholson halted a policy of the Administration for Chil-
dren’s Services in New York to remove children from their homes if
domestic violence had occurred there.30
Judge Weinstein responded to Sharwline Nicholson’s complaint
with speed, care, and compassion.  He invited the Juvenile Rights Di-
vision of the Legal Aid Society to participate as amicus, requested
that the parties consider amici representation of other interested per-
sons—the children themselves, the alleged perpetrators of domestic
violence—and considered a motion for class certification.31  At the
same time, he ordered the parties to get ready to go to trial immedi-
ately, class or no class.32  In granting a preliminary injunction support-
ive of the plaintiff class, Judge Weinstein found “widespread and
unnecessary cruelty by agencies of the City of New York towards
mothers abused by their consorts.”33
25. Id. at 1018.
26. Id. at 1033–34.
27. MORRIS, supra note 14, at 240.  On the feminist importance of this decision, see Melissa A.
Cohen, Vindicating the Matriarch: A Fair Housing Act Challenge to Federal No-Fault Evictions
from Public Housing, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 317 (2009) (using a Weinstein quote as an
epigraph).
28. See In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Nicholson v. Williams,
205 F.R.D. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding that some mothers in the class had statutory and due process rights to effective coun-
sel).  Decisional law in Nicholson by other judges includes Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154
(2d Cir. 2003) (certifying questions to the New York Court of Appeals); Nicholson v. Scoppetta,
820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004) (partially answering questions certified); and Nicholson v. Scoppetta,
116 F. App’x 313 (2d Cir. 2004) (remanding to the trial court to reconsider in light of the answers
to the certified questions).
29. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 153, 252.
30. Id. at 163–64.
31. Id. at 163.
32. MORRIS, supra note 14, at 296–97.
33. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 163.  Judge Weinstein also paid careful attention to the well-
being of the children involved. See id. at 202–04.
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B. Sentencing Female Offenders
Because my clerkship with Judge Weinstein took place early in the
era of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, I had a ringside seat at the
discomfort that these constraints imposed on him.  His disapproval of
their severity would eventually help to undo the prescription that
Congress imposed for more than two decades.34  Before the end of
this era in 2007, female offenders presented the Judge with several
opportunities to temper the Guidelines with humanity.
Judge Weinstein described United States v. Concepcion, a matter
that, like Nicholson, prompted him to publish several decisions,35 as
“the largest criminal case in terms of numbers of defendants ever
brought and processed in this district.”36  The defendants, most of
them single mothers, were poor Dominican immigrants who used fake
documents to cheat the government to the tune of about $45 million.37
Sentencing them more leniently than the Guidelines seemed to de-
cree, Weinstein explained his clemency in part by sharing blame be-
yond the women who had been convicted.  The Dominican
community in New York “must assume responsibility for dealing with
unacceptable criminal behavior,” he wrote in one of the Concepcion
decisions;38 for its part, the city government had been remiss for not
even bothering to match stated Social Security numbers with names.39
The defendants were “very good mothers,” Judge Weinstein told an
interviewer years later.40 They stole money “to give their children
something better.”41
Another device Judge Weinstein used to reduce sentence terms,
similar to the blame sharing he applied to sharp effect in Concepcion,
was to find in the Guidelines themselves an omission or even clueless-
ness.  Both during and after the Guidelines era, Weinstein invoked
rehabilitation—a value not embraced by the Sentencing Com-
mission42—to support lenient sentences for female defendants.43
34. MORRIS, supra note 14, at 278–79.
35. See United States v. Concepcion, 825 F. Supp. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); see also United States
v. Concepcion, 808 F. Supp. 166 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp.
1262 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
36. Concepcion, 825 F. Supp. at 23.
37. MORRIS, supra note 14, at 263–64.
38. Concepcion, 825 F. Supp. at 24.
39. Id at 25.
40. MORRIS, supra note 14, at 263.
41. Id.
42. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 98 (1993) (stating that “rehabilitation is no
longer a goal of sentencing under the Guidelines”).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, No. 07-CR-377(JBW), 2008 WL 1946018 (E.D.N.Y. May
1, 2008); United States v. DeRoover, 36 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); MORRIS, supra note
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Sometimes, he could avoid an overt condemnation of this omission by
simply availing himself of the Guidelines’ catchall “mitigating circum-
stance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into considera-
tion by the Sentencing Commission.”44
In United States v. Perez,45 for example, Weinstein concluded that
the defendant had suffered enough.  She had given birth while in cus-
tody for selling cocaine, turned the baby over to relatives, learned that
the baby (her only child) had died suddenly, and now faced deporta-
tion.46  “The Commission did not take into account” what the death of
an only child would feel like for an offender under these circum-
stances, he wrote.47
Three sentences issued by Judge Weinstein in the next year contin-
ued this empathy for women in trouble expressed in the form of
downward departures.   Pregnancy and its consequences under New
York state law supported two of them.48  In United States v. Gaviria,49
Weinstein noted that the Guidelines gave him no room to consider the
devastating consequences of coercive control on the defendant by a
batterer.50  Unable to depart downward, he would at least tell her
story.
The downward-departing and arguably soft-on-crime posture was
made more compelling by the backbone that nobody could deny, I
think.  Over the years, Weinstein had declined to coddle many offend-
ers.  Numerous prison terms that he imposed struck courts and ob-
servers as too severe.51  A respected judge with a history of stiff
sentences who opts for lenity draws attention to circumstances that
impose penalties of their own.
14, at 260 (citing the unpublished 1995 decision United States v. Rodriguez).  For an example of
when Judge Weinstein postponed sentencing to await information about whether rehabilitation
had occurred, see United States v. Flowers, 983 F. Supp. 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012).
45. 756 F. Supp. 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
46. Id. at 698.
47. Id.
48. In two decisions, Judge Weinstein noted that defendants who had been pregnant when
they were arrested faced losing custody of their children under New York law if they went to
prison for as long as the Guidelines mandated. MORRIS, supra note 14, at 258 (citing United
States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), and United States v. Arize, 792 F. Supp. 920
(E.D.N.Y. 1992)).
49. 804 F. Supp. 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
50. Id.
51. See MORRIS, supra note 14, at 272–73 (noting reversals of sentences imposed by Judge
Weinstein by the Second Circuit on the ground that they were too harsh); see also id. at 273 n.188
(recalling the Judge’s decision to sentence a jockey to ten years in prison for his conduct in a
betting scandal).
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A final example in this category of sentencing female offenders
adds the complication of a tripartite struggle, rather than the standard
binary of prosecutors versus defendants.  It too is a downward depar-
ture, but with more internal conflict. United States v. Blake52 gave
Judge Weinstein a chance to parse the eloquent impact statement that
came in the form of two letters about a female defendant from a fe-
male victim.  Summer Blake had stabbed Sheron Nauzo repeatedly in
her left hand while committing a clumsy, unavailing bank robbery.53
The stabbing caused Nauzo to suffer lingering disability, described
with care in her first letter;54  Nauzo wrote again after reviewing a
transcript of the sentencing hearing.55  Weinstein quoted from both
letters, and also elaborated on the importance of victim-impact con-
siderations, before giving Blake a relatively lenient noncustodial sen-
tence that included $5,000 as restitution to her victim.56
C. Women’s Civil Rights
Employment discrimination plaintiffs have a tough row to hoe all
over the country;57 and as a New York lawyer with a bit of limited
(though fairly recent) litigation experience on point, I have observed
especially tough barriers to entry in the Southern and Eastern Dis-
tricts.  When he sat by designation on a panel of his antagonist-and-
supporter, the Second Circuit,58 Judge Weinstein took the unusual
step of reversing summary judgment for an employer and remanding
an employment discrimination claim for trial.59  The political scientist,
law professor, and Symposium participant Jeffrey B. Morris has said
that the Judge “is no enthusiast about employment discrimination
claims,” despite being “liberal in most ways.”60  Yet in Gallagher v.
Delaney,61 Weinstein defied both the local consensus among judges
and whatever skepticism he may have felt about the category.
“[A] jury made up of a cross-section of our heterogeneous commu-
nities provides the appropriate institution for deciding whether bor-
52. 89 F. Supp. 2d 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
53. Id. at 331.
54. Id. at 334.
55. Id. at 336.
56. Id. at 352–53.
57. See generally Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001).
58. See James L. Oakes, Tribute, Jack Weinstein and His Love–Hate Relationship with the
Court of Appeals, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1951 (1997).
59. Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.2d 338, 350 (2d Cir. 1998) (Weinstein, J., sitting by
designation).
60. MORRIS, supra note 14, at 307.
61. 139 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1998).
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derline situations should be characterized as sexual harassment and
retaliation,” Judge Weinstein wrote.62  Juries know more on point
than an Article III judge: this decider may have started out someplace
different, but now “usually lives in a narrow segment of the enor-
mously broad American socio-economic spectrum” and also lacks
“real-life experience” relevant to the controversy.63  Weinstein sent
the dispute to this factfinder.64
Hill v. Berkman65 is a feminist Title VII case of a different stripe.
Nothing went to a jury: Judge Weinstein granted summary judgment
to a defendant employer.  What was feminist was its engagement with
a statutory impediment.  In this respect, it resembles United States v.
Gaviria, the sentencing decision in which Judge Weinstein found no
ground for the downward departure he wanted. Recall that in Gaviria,
Judge Weinstein did all he could for a woman by writing sympatheti-
cally about her plight and adverting to the justice of what she had
sought in his court.66
Taken on pro bono by an elite New York firm along with nonprofit
amici, Hill v. Berkman asked the court to apply Title VII to the
United States Army as an employer.  The undertaking was quixotic, to
put it mildly.  No precedent supported it.  The U.S. Attorney and the
Judge Advocate General moved for sanctions.67  Judge Weinstein de-
nied their Rule 11 motion and also gestured favorably toward Hill and
her attorneys, stating that “on balance, the arguments in favor of
granting women in the armed services the protection of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act are persuasive.”68  Joan Hill had to lose, he went
on to hold, because her combat-ineligibility functioned as a bona fide
occupational qualification for the Army’s discriminatory classifica-
tion,69 but she fared well in the dicta and statutory interpretation in-
cluded in the opinion.70  Although a year later a student commentator
faulted Hill v. Berkman for not taking a strong enough stance against
sex discrimination,71 it was then—and as far as I know it remains—the
62. Id. at 342.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 350.
65. 635 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).  This case is the only one discussed in this Article on
which I worked as a law clerk.
66. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
67. Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 1231.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1239.
70. Id.
71. Mary C. Griffin, Note, Making the Army Safe for Diversity: A Title VII Remedy for Dis-
crimination in the Military, 96 YALE L.J. 2082, 2094 (1987).
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only holding ever issued by any court “that Title VII applies to the
uniformed military.”72
Another feminist decision, Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Au-
thority,73 falls into the Hill v. Berkman category of moving civil litiga-
tion in a progressive direction notwithstanding the failure of the
plaintiff’s claim: Judge Weinstein ruled in favor of an ambitious liti-
gant but was reversed on appeal.74  He stated the problem crisply in
his opening paragraph:
This is a pristine hostile work environment case. The plaintiff,
herself a highly-regarded member of middle management, was al-
ways treated appropriately and with respect by her co-workers and
by her employer. She was never discriminated against on the basis
of sex, nor was she personally the target of inappropriate sexual be-
havior. There was, however, evidence of sexual harassment of other
women in her shop that caused her emotional distress. Whether this
was sufficient to create an actionable claim for hostile work envi-
ronment appears to be an issue of first impression.75
Making no apologies for the approach he took, Judge Weinstein asked
a provocative rhetorical question—“Would a rare Jewish person in a
Nazi concentration camp afforded privileged treatment while other
Jews were being horribly persecuted have no claim for the psychologi-
cal trauma of having to witness the abuse?”—and noted the harm of
an abusive environment with reference to Primo Levi, the Holocaust,
and the Soviet gulag.76
Weinstein dismissed some of the claims at the end of trial, and the
jury went on to reject more of them.77  At the end, the Judge entered
judgment for Leibovitz and the jury awarded her $60,000 for emo-
tional distress.78  He endorsed the jury’s affirmative answer to “Did
defendant New York City Transit Authority violate plaintiff Diane
Leibovitz’s rights by its deliberate indifference to widespread discrimi-
natory practices and sexual misconduct against others?”79
Judge Dennis Jacobs, writing for a Second Circuit panel, took a dif-
ferent view: “We hold that Title VII’s prohibition against hostile work
72. Robin Rogers, Comment, A Proposal for Combatting Sexual Discrimination in the Mili-
tary: Amendment of Title VII, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 165, 186 n.115 (1990).
73. 4 F. Supp. 2d 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
74. Leibovitz v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2001).
75. Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 146.
76. Id. at 152.  For a criticism of Judge Weinstein’s so-called “reductio ad Hitlerum” discourse
in Leibovitz, see Gabriel H. Teninbaum, Reductio ad Hitlerum: Trumping the Judicial Nazi
Card, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 556–57.
77. Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 146–47.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 147.
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environment discrimination affords no claim to a person who exper-
iences it by hearsay.”80  He rolled down the slippery slope: if Leibovitz
could recover for what she knew of only through the words of others,
the court might as well accept liability for harassment that was “going
on in a nearby office of another firm,” known to the plaintiff only via
“an infuriating newspaper article,” or even “a false rumor of a kind
that would be upsetting if true.”81  Federal decisional law on the issue
has been mixed.82
In this context, Judge Weinstein’s position went about as far as it
could to recognize the destruction inflicted by an environment rife
with harassment at some remove from the person who complained
about it.  His carefully written opinion may have generated some con-
cessions by the reversing court.83  It won attention in the secondary
literature.84  It also comports with what the appellate court precursor
to the leading Supreme Court decision on sexual harassment, Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,85 had to say about the Leibovitz issue,
admittedly in dicta: “Even a woman who was never herself the object
of harassment might have a Title VII claim if she were forced to work
in an atmosphere where such harassment was pervasive.”86
P. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.87 holds a curious place in the Weinstein
feminist corpus.  The Judge granted summary judgment to a defen-
80. Leibovitz, 252 F.3d at 182.
81. Id. at 189.
82. See Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 151 (“Dicta from other circuits support a broad prohibition
of hostile work environments encompassing gender harassment that degrades the workplace,
regardless of its initial direct targets” (citations omitted)); see also Dabney v. Christmas Tree
Shops, 958 F. Supp. 2d 439, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (concluding that reports about harassment of
coworkers was the type of hearsay condemned by the Second Circuit in Leibovitz and so the
plaintiff had to lose); Maluo v. Nakano, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (D. Haw. 2000) (“A sexual
harassment plaintiff need not have been the direct object of harassing behavior, and may base
his or her claim upon damages caused by the harassment of other employees.”).
83. For example, the Second Circuit (1) agreed that Diane Leibovitz had standing, Leibovitz,
252 F.3d at 185; (2) declined to use the doctrine of prudential standing against her claim, id. at
187–88; and (3) agreed that what it had scorned as “hearsay” could be considered in support of
support a direct claim of harassment, id. at 190.
84. Soon after its issuance, the decision occupied the center of student commentary. Compare
Christopher M. O’Connor, Note, Stop Harassing Her or We’ll Both Sue: Bystander Injury Sexual
Harassment, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501 (1999) (admiring the decision), with L. Robert
Guenthner, III, Recent Development, Who Is the Victim Here? Vicarious Sexual Harassment
After Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Authority, 55 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 299
(1999) (arguing that Judge Weinstein’s recognition of the claim conflicts with congressional in-
tent and is unwise). See also Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII
Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 129–31 (2002) (examining through the lens
of “solidarity” what Diane Leibovitz experienced and objected to at work).
85. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
86. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
87. 102 F. Supp. 2d 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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dant employer in a Title VII claim by a female employee who alleged
hostile environment sexual harassment and New York torts.  Doesn’t
sound very feminist, perhaps, but as I read the case Judge Weinstein
did part of the necessary progressive work.  The Second Circuit, af-
firming in part and reversing in part, did the rest.88
The Weinstein opinion in P. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. may be read as
an answer to the student commentator who responded to Leibovitz by
asking, in effect, “What can a well-intentioned employer do to win in
Judge Weinstein’s court?”89 P. offers a thoughtful response.  In toss-
ing the hostile environment claim of a flight attendant who blamed
Delta for the sexual assault she said she suffered after a coworker
drugged her in his Rome hotel room,90 Judge Weinstein reasoned that
Delta was not at fault.  The assailant had no supervisory authority
over the plaintiff, Penny Ferris; Delta had insufficient knowledge of
his propensities, Weinstein concluded; and Delta maintained an admi-
rably comprehensive policy with respect to the harassment complaints
of its employees.91  Although a woman lost and a big publicly traded
company won, P. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. can rest in the Weinstein
feminist column.  Delta received summary judgment but had to go
through a trial, present its sexual harassment policy for close review,
and respond to the New York tort claims that Ferris included in her
complaint.  The decision gave guidance to employers while taking sex-
ual harassment and sexual assault seriously.
For its part, the Second Circuit honed in on the weak spot of Judge
Weinstein’s decision.  Whereas Weinstein did not think that past re-
ports that the coworker, Michael Young, had used date rape drugs
were sufficient to create notice on Delta’s part, Judge Pierre Leval,
writing for the Second Circuit panel, disagreed: “A reasonable
factfinder might conclude that Delta’s negligence made it responsible
for Ferris’s rape.  Delta had notice of Young’s proclivity to rape co-
workers.”92  Leval also faulted the choice of a Delta supervisor to
minimize and bury an earlier report.93  Read together, P. v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., the Weinstein decision, and Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
the Second Circuit reversal, yield a comprehensively progressive re-
sponse to the claim of a vulnerable female worker.  Judge Weinstein
88. Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2001).
89. See Guenthner, supra note 84, at 314–15.
90. The jury had ten members; Judge Weinstein declared a mistrial when it “split nine to one
in favor of defendants on the underlying question of whether a rape had in fact occurred.” P.,
102 F. Supp. 2d at 135.
91. Id. at 138–42.
92. Ferris, 277 F.3d at 133, 136.
93. Id. at 136.
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did not provide all the feminism—and he probably erred on the ques-
tion of Delta’s knowledge and responsibility—but the respect he
showed an employee’s complaint provides a model for trial judges
who believe that they must give summary judgment to a defendant
employer.
Judge Weinstein achieved additional feminist progress in construing
another antidiscrimination statute.  Title IX, as applied to sports, has
long been a target of conservative critics:  individuals who refrain
from attacking bans on discrimination in housing and employment re-
frain less when they have a chance to attack bans on discrimination in
athletics.94  Undisturbed by this backlash, Weinstein ruled capaciously
for a plaintiff in Sternberg v. U.S.A. National Karate-Do Federation.95
Ilyse Sternberg alleged that the defendant, whose name Weinstein
shortened to the Karate Federation, withdrew its support for sending
a Karate sparring team to the world championships for sex-discrimina-
tory reasons.
Weinstein issued several bold rulings: (1) that the Karate Founda-
tion’s work was “educational” and thus eligible for Title IX coverage;
(2) that its withdrawal of support was state action (via funding from
the federal government to the United States Olympic Committee
which, in turn, sends money to the Karate Foundation);96 and (3) that
Sternberg had a private right of action under the Ted Stevens Olympic
and Amateur Sports Act of 1978.97  None of these conclusions had
much precedent behind it; the Judge simply called them as he saw
them.  Unlike P. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., a divided victory, Sternberg
gave a sex-discrimination plaintiff everything she asked for.
D. The Woman’s Constitution
When he proposed a “woman’s constitution,”98 Kenneth L. Karst
partook of what sometimes gets called “relational feminism,” an aca-
94. Although this criticism occasionally strays into other topics—see, for example, Linda
Flanagan & Susan H. Greenberg, How Title IX Hurts Female Athletes, ATLANTIC (Feb. 27,
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/02/how-title-ix-hurts-female-ath-
letes/253525/—most of it complains that young men are being shortchanged. See Valerie Strauss,
Has Title IX, Now 40 Years Old, Harmed Male Athletics?, WASH. POST (June 24, 2012, 11:30
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/has-title-ix-now-40-years-old-
harmed-male-athletics/2012/06/14/gJQArSCqdV_blog.html (summarizing these criticisms).
95. 123 F. Supp. 2d 659 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
96. Id. at 661.
97. Id. at 662–63, 666.
98. Kenneth L. Karst, Woman’s Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447.
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demic effort focused on differences between men and women.99 One
need not embrace relational feminism—I don’t, and as far as I can tell
Judge Weinstein doesn’t either—to find a woman’s constitution in the
Weinstein corpus.  Judge Weinstein has had occasion to read the
United States Constitution as a source of rights and opportunities for
women, without needing to generalize about women’s nature.
Ganzy v. Allen Christian School100 lands in the woman’s constitu-
tion section of this Article for reasons I’ll get to in a minute: it also
construed Title VII and thus had a home with the civil rights cases
directly above.  Decided the same year as Weinstein’s stint on a Sec-
ond Circuit panel noted above,101 Ganzy made the same choice to
send a gendered dispute to what Weinstein called “the Constitutional
Institution for Resolving Ambiguity.”102  The defendant, a church-
affiliated school,103 fired Michelle Ganzy, an unmarried woman, from
her job as a teacher after its managers learned (from reading student
toilet-stall graffiti) that she was pregnant.104  Ganzy had signed the
school’s Statement of Belief agreeing that her life was “governed” by
Holy Scripture, but made no promise to abstain from premarital sex-
ual intercourse.105
Judge Weinstein included what he called a “brief, non-comprehen-
sive” disquisition on the history of American sexual mores, including a
discussion of virginity and chastity demands imposed on women and
the rise of abstinence promotion in U.S. schools; it ran several
pages.106 He provided a similar summary history of women in the
workforce.107 The actual decision portion of the opinion was relatively
short.  Weinstein agreed with the school that it was a religious institu-
tion, but held that this status did not immunize it from Title VII
liability.108
99. Norma Basch, Reconstructing Female Citizenship: Minor v. Happersett, in THE CONSTITU-
TION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE: CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY EXPERI-
ENCE 52, 54–55 (Donald G. Niemen ed., 1992) (so characterizing Karst).
100. 995 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
101. See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text (discussing Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.2d
338 (2d Cir. 1998)).
102. Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 360.
103. The Allen Christian School was founded in 1982 by Floyd Flake, a minister and former
member of Congress, and his wife, also a minister.  Maria Alvarez, Allen Christian School in
Queens To Close, NEWSDAY (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/allen-
christian-school-in-queens-to-close-1.3533617.  For three decades, the school was a fixture in the
mostly African-American neighborhoods of southeastern Queens. Id.
104. Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 345, 360.
105. Id. at 344.
106. Id. at 350–54.
107. Id. at 354–58.
108. Id. at 359–61.
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Ganzy presented the Judge with an instance of free exercise rights
in tension with antidiscrimination principles—a conflict that preceded
this 1998 dispute and that has grown more pointed in years follow-
ing.109 As Judge Weinstein analyzed the rights of Allen Christian
School, this employer could fire a female employee for failing to ad-
here to the religious teachings it espoused, but only if it held male
employees to the same standard.  It could not fire a female employee
for becoming pregnant out of wedlock, even if its objections to pre-
marital sex were sincere.110 What had really happened between the
parties—sex discrimination on the one hand or a principled, gender-
neutral stance against fornication on the other—was, for the Judge, a
question of fact best sorted out by a New York “heterogeneous
jury.”111
If I were the plaintiff in Ganzy v. Allen Christian School, I suppose I
would have rather had an entry of summary judgment in my favor
than the actual Weinstein decision I won.112 Cheaper, less stressful,
less risky, less embarrassing.  But sending the case to lay factfinders
was almost as likely as summary judgment to come out in favor of the
plaintiff and did more for the Woman’s Constitution.113  Jurors might
have started their work wrongly believing that a religious entity is ex-
empted from sex discrimination law—they know about the all-male
Roman Catholic priesthood, for example—and Ganzy v. Allen Chris-
tian School jury instructions would have taught them otherwise.  Go-
ing to trial would have forced the church-affiliated defendant to
emphasize its commitment to a workplace free of sex discrimination.
It might never have had to express this position before.114  Especially
because women are, or at least appear to be, disproportionately vul-
109. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783–84 (2014); Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (ruling against a photography company
whose principals, citing religious objections, had refused to photograph a lesbian couple’s com-
mitment ceremony).
110. Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 359–60.
111. Id. at 360.  A more recent free-exercise-meets-discrimination case from the Sixth Circuit
came to the same conclusion about the need to send the factual question of pretext to the jury.
Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 740–41 (6th Cir. 2012) (involving a claim by a graduate student who
claimed that her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when she was expelled
from a master’s program).
112. Summary judgment for plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases is rare, but it does
get granted.  EEOC v. CITI Global Solutions, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 2d 897, 908 (D. Md. 2011); see
also Hillesland v. Paccar, Inc., 722 P.2d 1239, 1242–44 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing trial court
for the error of failing to enter summary judgment for plaintiff).
113. As Judge Weinstein wrote, a jury “might simply not believe the Plaintiff’s version of the
incident.” Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 360.
114. See id. (noting that the record was sparse).
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nerable to harms launched in the name of free exercise,115 Judge
Weinstein’s rigorous application of the doctrine brings their interests
to the constitutional fore.
Kramer v. New York City Board of Education116 presents a consti-
tutional complement to Ganzy.   Whereas Ganzy reads the free exer-
cise portion of the First Amendment relatively narrowly,
understanding it to protect one value that must coexist with others,
Kramer expands constitutional rights relating to free speech; both de-
cisions advance the welfare of female litigants.
Faith Kramer was “a forty-eight-year-old, tenured, state-licensed,
twenty-six-year veteran teacher in the New York City public
schools”117 who got into trouble when she took a bold approach to a
mandatory lesson on HIV transmission with her class of eighth-grad-
ers.  “Ms. Kramer,” Judge Weinstein wrote, “asked the students to
provide words that they had heard or used when speaking about sex-
ual acts, body parts, or bodily fluids.”  She wrote the volunteered
slang words on the blackboard, and “[w]here applicable, she associ-
ated each word with its more socially acceptable equivalent, such as
‘breast,’ ‘penis,’ and ‘vagina.’”118
The next day, Kramer was summoned to the assistant principal’s
office and told that parents had objected to her pedagogy.  The day
after that, the school sent Kramer a letter saying she was out of her
classroom, effective immediately, pending investigation of an allega-
tion that Kramer’s presentation consisted of, oddly enough, “Corporal
Punishment.”119  Kramer’s HIV lesson caused her to be
removed from the classroom, kept in non-teaching detention for
eight months, investigated, provisionally determined by her princi-
pal to have committed a serious violation of a school regulation,
denied a satisfactory rating for the school year, and deprived of the
extra income she had previously been earning from extra “per ses-
sion” assignments.120
Faith Kramer brought an action in the Eastern District.
Judge Weinstein relied on lack of notice to find for the plaintiff.
The pedagogy she chose violated no regulations, as the Board of Edu-
cation conceded.121  The “corporal punishment” accusation the defen-
dant first lobbed was absurd, Judge Weinstein found, and the
115. See cases cited supra note 109.
116. 715 F. Supp. 2d 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
117. Id. at 342.
118. Id. at 345.
119. Id. at 347.
120. Id. at 341.
121. Id. at 360.
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substitute rationale the Board came up with later, a ban on “verbal
abuse of students” via “language that tends to cause . . . mental dis-
tress,”122 could not work either: “Ms. Kramer was trying to help, not
to hurt, her students.”123
Judge Weinstein did not conclude that Kramer’s free speech rights
had been violated.  He couldn’t: what government employees may say
is limited by crabbed decisional law.124  Faith Kramer spoke pursuant
to her job duties, which were to follow state regulations for the curric-
ulum.125  She had to hew to something close to a script.
Constrained by precedent, Weinstein found an ingenious way to
honor Kramer’s freedom of speech.  He published an appendix to his
decision that defined the student-volunteered words Kramer had writ-
ten on the board, relying on eight lexicons (including Spanish and Yid-
dish dictionaries, useful for terms like puton and schlong).126  He also
devoted a long section of his opinion to a discussion of sexually ex-
plicit language in literature, popular culture, and public health.127  At
a hearing in Weinstein’s court, Kramer testified that she had returned
to the classroom where she was receiving her usual high marks.128  She
still elicited street slang for her HIV discussion, she said, but “felt ex-
tremely uncomfortable with it because I’m afraid, honestly,”129 and so
she now asked her students “to write down terms they knew on large
sheets of paper” instead of the blackboard.130  Reprinting photo-
copied pages from Kramer’s students’ notebooks, Kramer v. New
York City Board of Education gave back to Faith Kramer the nearest
equivalent of her big word-filled blackboard.
Another enlargement of the Woman’s Constitution appears in Pu-
linario v. Goord,131 a habeas decision.  As I can attest from my experi-
ence in chambers and as has been documented, Judge Weinstein
grapples with the often-chaotic pile of habeas petitions himself rather
122. Kramer, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 360 (alteration in original).
123. Id.
124. I had occasion to consider the state of this case law when I composed a moot court
exercise involving adverse consequences of speech spoken by a fictitious state-employed plain-
tiff. See Anita Bernstein, Themes, Doctrine, and Pedagogy in the 2013–14 National Health Law
Moot Court Competition Problem, 35 AM. J. LEGAL MED. 345 (2014).  Judge Weinstein himself
once contributed to this constraining decisional law, although he tempered his ruling with dicta
supportive of “asylum” from dismissal. See MORRIS, supra note 14, at 300–01 (discussing
Gordon v. Griffith, 88 F. Supp. 2d 38, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)).
125. Kramer, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 357.
126. Id. at app. A 373–77.
127. Id. at 362–70.
128. Id. at 350–51.
129. Id. at 351.
130. Id.  Judge Weinstein did the questioning himself.
131. 291 F. Supp. 2d 154 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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than punt them to a law clerk or magistrate judge.132  More than a
decade ago, at the age of eighty-two, he volunteered to clear nearly
eight hundred backlogged habeas cases pending in the Eastern Dis-
trict.  The grateful court assigned five hundred of them to him, along
with a former law clerk as special master.133  One successful petition
came from Keila Pulinario, a twenty-one-year-old killer whose I.Q.
had been measured at 70.134
Judge Weinstein ruled that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to counsel had been violated by the decision of a state trial judge to
prohibit her from introducing evidence of post-traumatic stress disor-
der that could have supported a “mental disease or defect” defense
entitling her to acquittal of the murder charge she faced, or a defense
of extreme emotional disturbance that would have permitted the jury
to convict her of manslaughter instead of murder.135  Especially be-
cause the Sixth Amendment has rendered so much advantage to rap-
ists and batterers,136 Pulinario makes a vital contribution to gender-
progressive case law.  It shares with women the benefit of a constitu-
tional right enjoyed on the ground much more by men.
E. Women’s Redress for Personal Injury
If Judge Weinstein had sat on the state court bench,137 or if the Erie
doctrine did not bar him from making or finding the common law of
torts in an overt way, I suppose I could have had more of my dream
clerkship with him in these alternate universes, torts being my favorite
subject.  Fortunately, Judge Weinstein is large, he contains multi-
132. See MORRIS, supra note 14, at 291.  He did the same thing with the equally hard-to-read
Social Security disability appeals, at least back in my day.
133. Id. at 290.
134. Pulinario, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 157.
135. Id. at 162.
136. See, e.g., Coronado v. State, 351 S.W.3d 315, 329  (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (observing that
Crawford confrontation rights for defendants raise “a heavy price” for “battered women, small
children, and other fragile witnesses . . . but it is the price that our constitution and our Supreme
Court requires”); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 749
(2005) (noting that Crawford undermined numerous “domestic violence cases that would have
presented little difficulty [for prosecutors] in the past”); J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J.
Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 545
(1980) (concluding “reluctantly” that some prohibitions on cross-examining victims to elicit testi-
mony about their sexual history “violate the sixth amendment right to defend oneself”).
137. Weinstein once tried to get there.  He ran for the chief judgeship of New York’s highest
court back when it was an elective office; he almost won the Democratic nomination. MORRIS,
supra note 14, at 155–57.
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tudes,138 and so he had time to change tort law too.  He used the tools
he had at hand, mainly procedural rules.  Women gained.
Diethylstilbestrol (DES) litigation occupies two illustrative cases.
The first, Braune v. Abbott Laboratories,139 which reached Judge
Weinstein’s court via diversity jurisdiction, read a New York statute of
limitation to expand redress for an all-female group of plaintiffs in-
jured by DES.140 Braune featured a statute, enacted in 1986, that cre-
ated a special discovery rule for DES claims: the three-year limitation
period starts to run on “discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from
the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury
should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier.”141
For Judge Weinstein, this discovery rule meant not a victim’s aware-
ness of illness, but “her awareness that her medical problem was
‘caused’ by something extrinsic to her biology—that someone has
done something to her.”142  This interpretation of discovery conflicted
with all prior New York holdings on the issue (none of them binding
in Braune), as Weinstein scrupulously reported,143 but to hew to this
narrow view would have made “New York’s discovery rule the most
restrictive in the nation.”144  The Judge opted for humane empathy
instead, and did so without condescending to the plaintiffs.145
Like Braune, the second illustrative case also examined the juncture
of DES with rules of adjudication.  Two manufacturers claimed that
they were not subject to jurisdiction in New York because they had no
corporate office or presence inside the boundaries of the state, never
shipped DES to New York, and never had a license to do business in
New York.146  Weinstein disagreed, and also construed choice of law
doctrine to provide for application of New York rather than California
138. See WALT WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS 55 (1855); see also MORRIS, supra note 14, at 57
(reporting that former law clerk Joan Wexler found Judge Weinstein “interested in everything”);
Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False Cure for Toxic Exposure, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2153, 2153 (1997) (remarking that “an invitation to write about ‘one of Judge
Weinstein’s interests’ resembles an invitation to write about Life”).
139. 895 F. Supp. 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
140. New York was a leader among the states on this issue. See Anita Bernstein, Markets of
Mothers, in TORTS STORIES 151, 251 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003) (ex-
amining Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989)).
141. Braune, 895 F. Supp. at 542 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c).
142. Id. at 545.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 549.
145. Id. at 550–52.
146. Ashley v. Abbott Labs. (In re DES Cases), 789 F. Supp. 552, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
Strictly speaking, one of the two defendants was licensed to do business in New York, but its
liability stemmed from the actions of a predecessor corporation that had held no such license.
Id. at 591.
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law.147  In response to an argument by one of the manufacturers that it
was in essence too small to be worth suing, Judge Weinstein said no:
New York precedent “regards the dismissal of even ‘small players’ as
a significant harm to DES plaintiffs.”148
F. Feminism Beyond Women
Decisional law that Judge Weinstein has published advanced gender
progress even though women were not present as parties.  In some of
these decisions men sought relief, and what they won had good effects
for women and gender justice generally.  My examples of litigants
“beyond women” also include a girl and a transgender plaintiff whose
identity as a woman reached Weinstein as a matter of debate.
In United States v. Bannister,149 Judge Weinstein considered what
happens to nondefendants when young African-American men re-
ceive long prison sentences.  Their families suffer in numerous ways:
“Prisoners’ children,” he wrote, “may experience numerous conse-
quences of incarceration, including loss of contact with the incarcer-
ated parent, strained relationships with caregivers, a diminished sense
of stability and safety, economic insecurity, social stigma, shame, in-
creased risk of drug involvement, and susceptibility to adverse peer
pressure and risky behavior.”150  Nondefendant family members face
detrimental collateral consequences of felony convictions,151 as Judge
Weinstein knew from his experience as a sentencing judge.152  One
alternative to incarceration he praised in Bannister, noncustodial sen-
tencing, enables defendants to earn wage income and help support
their (sometimes female) children and other dependents.153
At the end of the long opinion, Judge Weinstein returned to his
long-held interest in rehabilitation,154 noting how it benefits persons
other than defendants:
For nonviolent, low-level drug crimes, the goals of sentencing—
general and specific deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and re-
147. Id. at 576. This decision offered these female plaintiffs an advantage: the defendants did
not have the opportunity to exonerate themselves by proving that they had not supplied DES to
particular individuals, which California decisional law extended to them and New York deci-
sional law withheld.
148. Id. at 593–94.  For my development of a similar idea, see Anita Bernstein, Civil Rights
Violations = Broken Windows: De Minimis Curet Lex, 62 FLA. L. REV. 895 (2010).
149. 786 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
150. Id. at 653.
151. Id. at 654.
152. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (discussing the decision of Judge Weinstein
to spare a great-grandmother from eviction from her public-housing apartment).
153. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 656–57.
154. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
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habilitation—could in most cases be achieved with limited incarcer-
ation, through a system of intense supervised release utilizing home
visits; meetings with parole officers; a combination of counseling,
drug and alcohol treatment, education, job training, and job place-
ment; and electronic monitoring to prevent flight, promote positive
choices, and deter and detect incipient crime. Such a regime would
likely be more effective in reducing crime and much less costly than
imprisonment. Given discouraging economic, social, and psycholog-
ical conditions, it seems doubtful that the long sentences of incarcer-
ation imposed will appreciably reduce crime.155
Looking at a group of men who were suffering, in sum, Judge Wein-
stein also saw women.
Race and male gender came together in McMillan v. City of New
York,156 a decision that won academic feminist attention.  This case
posed the vexing problem of how to use actuarial data to build an
informed estimate of future personal injury damages.  Curiously,
courts took a long time to notice the fairness concerns.157
James McMillan was rendered quadriplegic when a New York ferry-
boat crashed.  He would need medical care for the rest of his life.
How long would that be?  Lawyers and judges have traditionally used
race to inform this estimate, deferring to actuarial predictions that Af-
rican-American persons live shorter lives than their Caucasian-Ameri-
can counterparts.  In refusing to do so, Judge Weinstein joined a
handful of courts and a strand in feminist scholarship, especially writ-
ings by Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins.158  James McMillan
was not a woman: but his victory aligned with and strengthened the
victories of female personal injury claimants.159
155. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
156. 253 F.R.D. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
157. “Many readers may be very surprised to learn that traditionally, courts have used, or
allowed juries to use, race when determining damages in civil cases.” Anthony J. Sebok, Judge
Jack Weinstein’s Ruling Barring the Use of Race in Calculating the Expected Lifespan of a Man
Seeking Tort Damages: An Isolated Decision, or the Beginning of a Legal Revolution?, FINDLAW
(Oct. 22, 2008), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20081022.html.
158. McMillan, 253 F.R.D. at 251–55 (citing Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort
Cases: Race, Gender, and the Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1442
(2005); Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic
Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1994); Jennifer B.
Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on Race and Remedies, 1865–2007, 27 REV.
LITIG. 37 (2007)).  I have long held an interest in this issue and once successfully encouraged a
student to write about it.  Sherri R. Lamb, Note, Toward Gender-Neutral Data for Adjudicating
Lost Future Earning Damages: An Evidentiary Perspective, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 299 (1996).
159. See McMillan, 253 F.R.D. at 254 (noting the decision by September 11 Victim Compensa-
tion Fund special master Kenneth Feinberg not to harm female worker–victims with gendered
estimates of how long they would have remained in the workforce); see also Sebok, supra note
157 (pointing out that the McMillan reasoning applies not only to expected lifespans but ex-
pected earnings per year, and to gender as well as race).
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A very different “feminism beyond women” decision comes from
Judge Weinstein’s early days on the bench. In re Johnson160 involved
a naturalization petition filed back when the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act provided that an act of adultery committed within five years
of the filing precluded a finding of good moral character and thus
barred an applicant from citizenship.161  Mr. Johnson had not known
that his wife was married to another man (she had been living apart
from this husband) when they commenced their relationship.
At one level—an unfortunate level for anyone who would just as
soon not dwell on a naturalization petitioner’s sexual relationship with
a consenting adult who later became his wife—the adultery question
was easy.  Federal law did not define adultery, yet insisted it be
heeded, suggesting a need to turn to state sources.  New York criminal
law at the time that Johnson engaged in the conduct defined adultery
as “the sexual intercourse of two persons, either of whom is married
to a third person.”162  The state later liberalized this crime to permit a
defense of reasonable mistake about the marital status of one’s part-
ner, a change that implies that Johnson’s conduct fell within the
boundaries of the prohibition when it occurred.  For naturalization
purposes, Judge Weinstein “acquitted” him anyway, insisting that the
no-citizenship rule, which referenced moral turpitude, made no sense
without a mens rea requirement.163
A trivial dispute, perhaps.  Even Mr. Johnson’s nominal adversary,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, did not think the petition
should have been denied.  Yet the ruling contributed to gender pro-
gress.  Joining a small number of earlier judicial decisions that came
out the same way on the question,164 Johnson took a stand for sexual
privacy and liberty.  Its struggle to site its result in principled reason-
ing, I speculate, helped Congress repeal the adultery bar to citizenship
decades later.
Feminism Beyond Women covers not only male parties but also fe-
male children, and here Judge Weinstein’s care and attention achieved
progress in T.K. ex rel. L.K. v. New York City Department of Educa-
tion.165  The plaintiff, a learning-disabled twelve-year-old girl identi-
160. 292 F. Supp. 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
161. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(f)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(2) (1976), repealed
by Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 2(c)(1), 95 Stat.
1611, 1611 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(2)).
162. In re Johnson, 292 F. Supp. at 382.
163. Id. at 383–84.
164. See, e.g., In re Edgar, 253 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1966); Dickhoff v. Shaughnessy, 142
F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).  Judge Weinstein did not cite these precedents.
165. 779 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
2015] FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 363
fied as L.K., complained of bullying that a school district ignored.
Judge Weinstein denied the city’s motion for summary judgment,
holding that under the Individuals with Disability Education Act,
young L.K. had recourse if school personnel were “deliberately indif-
ferent to, or failed to take reasonable steps to prevent[,] bullying that
substantially restricted” her in her “educational opportunities.”166
Because the Second Circuit had not ruled on the issue, Judge Wein-
stein perused case law from other courts.  He endorsed the most vic-
tim-supportive judicial analysis in the country, a decision from the
Third Circuit.167
Manago v. Barnhart168 ruled on gender identity disorder.  I wish to
make no grandiose claims for its status as feminist or otherwise pro-
gressive case law.  Instead, consistent with the approach of this Arti-
cle, I note the ways in which this Judge Weinstein decision went
further in a progressive direction than contemporaneous statutes and
cases.  Judge Weinstein was ahead of his time.
Decided in 2004, Manago reversed an administrative ruling that an
individual known as both Joseph Manago and Joanna Manago could
not receive Social Security disability insurance.169  Judge Weinstein
put effort into the gendered-pronouns problem, using the noun
“claimant” to avoid “he” and “she” and “claimant’s” instead of “his”
and “her.”170  This choice was more accepting of Manago’s identity
than the report by a psychotherapist who specialized in gender-iden-
tity disorders who had opined that Manago suffered “an ongoing total
disability;” this expert used “he” as well as “he/she” and “his/her” —
never “she” nor gender-evasion of the sort Weinstein adopted—in
language the Judge quoted from the report.171
Next Weinstein, having noted that Manago cited no cases to support
her petition,172 read the record generously on questions of when the
disability began and what the medical evidence showed.173  When a
student author several years later wrote that “it may be possible for
some individuals who suffer from extreme distress over their gender
identity to obtain Social Security disability insurance benefits,”
166. Id. at 316.  The Judge did grant the city summary judgment on an unrelated point. Id. at
319.
167. Id. at 312–13.
168. 321 F. Supp. 2d 559 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
169. Id. at 570.
170. Id. at 562–63.
171. Id. at 564–65.
172. Id. at 561.
173. Id. at 568–70.
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Manago was the only case cited in the inevitable footnote.174  This
writer also pointed out that both the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 explicitly exclude gender-identity
disorders from disability protection.175 Manago is not the nation’s
boldest-ever trans decision.176  It is humble: only a Social Security dis-
ability appeal, readers might think.  Yet here, consistent with other
examples surveyed in this Article, Judge Weinstein achieved a gender-
progressive outcome in a dispute before him.  Most of his contempo-
raries in Congress and on the bench have not had an occasion to reach
a humane and liberal end like this one.
III. APPLICATIONS AND INFERENCES
We may now consider what is “feminist” in the primary sources
gathered in the last Part.   The conjunction of this word with law or
legal theory creates a challenge for secondary writings like this Arti-
cle.  As Symposium participant Elizabeth Schneider once noted,
“[T]here is no single feminist theory, but many feminist theories,”
from which one can find—and one must find, if the category is to
make any sense—“some common underlying themes.”177
I have mentioned that Judge Weinstein eschewed feminism in the
sense that feminism amounts to an overt, conscious ideological
agenda.  How then could he have generated feminist jurisprudence?
To find an answer, I follow Elizabeth Schneider’s lead and focus on a
few themes that characterize, rather than establish or define in any
determinate fashion, feminist law.
174. Jaime Johnson, Comment, Recognition of the Nonhuman: The Psychological Minefield of
Transgender Inequality in the Law, 34 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 153, 157 & n.36 (2010).
175. Id.  Camille He´bert notes that this exclusion could have been rooted in a progressive
understanding—that is, “not wanting to pathologize certain individuals and conditions”—but in
fact was attributable to the bigotry of some members of Congress.  L. Camille He´bert, Trans-
forming Transsexual and Transgender Rights, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 535, 540–41
(2009).  Strife about transgenderism continues to thwart the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act, a bill that remains unenacted twenty years after its introduction by the first openly gay
member of Congress.
176. One might give that honor to Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011), in which
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed an Atlanta trial court’s finding of a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause when a Georgia governmental employer terminated an employee for gender non-
conformity, or Doe v. Regional School Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600 (Me. 2014), a 2014 Maine Supreme
Court decision holding that under state human rights law a transgender school child had a right
to use the girls’ restroom.
177. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Gendering and Engendering Process, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1223,
1225 (1993).
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A. Cui Bono?  Cui Pacat?
This theme is the simplest one.  Reading the Weinstein corpus in
terms of Who benefits?  Who pays?  identifies a practical kind of femi-
nism.178  Judge Weinstein caused women to fare better in material,
concrete terms.
Think about the sets of cases with which we began.  The Judge put
slightly more money into a 1970s welfare check.  He allowed a woman
to remain in her home even though her grandchild, who also lived
there, sold drugs.  He allowed a mother to keep her child after she had
been victimized by domestic violence.  He adopted leniency in sen-
tencing in recognition of mitigating conditions in a woman’s record.
Slight?  Easy? Pages of an academic journal keep oppressive envi-
ronments at some remove, and the courtroom partitions litigants from
an assigned judge.  Poverty, crime, and a feeling of threat about de-
pendent children have never kicked me personally in the gut.  Jack
Weinstein would be the first to acknowledge his good fortune on the
point.  Life tenured since 1968 in a job he enjoys, augmenting his judi-
cial salary with royalty income from decades of classic books that sell
well, he could have chosen to snuggle deeply in the comfort he
worked to earn; the misery of female litigants could have escaped him.
Instead, Judge Weinstein remains aware of the humanity that he and
these people share.
Other women received unusually humane treatment in Weinstein’s
court.  We have looked at the civil side of the docket and a habeas
case for examples. Gallagher v. Delaney and Ganzy v. Allen Christian
School sent to the jury questions that federal judges usually answer
themselves in the form of summary judgment for the antagonists of
female litigants.179 Sternberg gave a Title IX victory to a female ath-
lete.180 Hill v. Berkman extended Title VII employment discrimina-
tion constraints on the Army, also to the benefit of a woman.181  In the
only decision discussed in this Article where a female plaintiff lost,
Judge Weinstein went out of his way to note the progressive conduct
of a corporate employer, aiding the cause of antidiscrimination
efforts.182
178. I used this approach to feminist jurisprudence in Anita Bernstein, Gender in Asbestos
Law: Cui Bono? Cui Pacat?, 88 TULANE L. REV. 1211 (2014).
179. See supra notes 59–64, 100–108 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
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B. Substance in Procedure183
Much of Judge Weinstein’s creativity on the bench expressed itself
through procedural innovation.  These progressive maneuvers
achieved important substantive ends.  Returning again to Elizabeth
Schneider, who observed that “a fundamental aspect of feminist the-
ory and practice is an emphasis on process, the process of connec-
tion,”184 we find feminist jurisprudence in ventures that Judge
Weinstein has undertaken.
Take for example the Dominican-immigrant convicted criminals of
United States v. Concepcion as Judge Weinstein described them: “very
good mothers.”185  Not a procedural move on his part—he said these
few words to an interviewer rather than in a judicial decision, off the
record so to speak—but diction that sounds unfamiliar at first and
then turns out to have substantive support.  Judge Weinstein fresh-
ened a near cliche´ when he applied it to newcomers.   His dynamic
description is an exercise in procedure, or process, “important in and
of itself, but also because process profoundly affects results and the
way in which people experience both process and result.”186
Liberal use of the jury also installed gains for women and feminist
principles. Ganzy v. Allen Christian School ventilated a religion-
based rationale for adverse conduct to a woman who had been ag-
grieved by it in the form of pregnancy discrimination.  She might or
might not deserve to prevail, but through this decision she reached
peer factfinders.  Other Weinstein decisions that sent civil cases to the
jury, notably Gallagher v. Delaney, invited education for jurors, liti-
gants, judges, and observers of the judicial system.  A civil jury trial
uses rules of procedure (and related sources like the law of evidence)
to add nonprofessional experiences and perspectives to the otherwise
isolated and self-referential environment of adjudication.187  Jurors do
not arrive in court free of elite antecedents, to be sure,188 but the pro-
cedures that guide and underscore their powers add progressive influ-
ence to the law.
183. Cf. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Procedure as Substance, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. XXX (2015).
184. Schneider, supra note 177, at 1226.
185. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
186. Schneider, supra note 177, at 1226.
187. See generally Phoebe Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 29
(1994) (finding in the jury a means to include contributions from outsiders and enhance
representation).
188. Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure
Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 773, 779 (2006) (observing that individuals can join a jury
“only if they bear markers of relative privilege: driver’s licenses, home ownership, registration
on the voter rolls”).
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Another illustration (among too many to note)189 of Judge Wein-
stein’s progressive uses of procedure comes from the two DES cases
noted above, in which a statute of limitations and rules of personal
jurisdiction received open-minded yet carefully reasoned analysis.
Weinstein treated the manufacturing defendants fairly when he ruled
against them.  Women benefited, but their benefit was not a foregone
conclusion.  Procedural innovation lived compatibly with principle in
these decisions—as it always can.
C. Insights into Two Divides of Feminist Legal Theory
The feminist jurisprudence of Jack Weinstein has another helpful
effect: it bridges two gaps that have riven the field.  To describe them,
I’ll oversimplify a bit.
1. The Third and Second Waves
One of these two divisions emerged when third-wave feminism
arose in the 1980s to challenge an ascendant older generation of the
movement.  According to one book calling itself an “encyclopedia” of
the subject, third-wave feminism identifies “feminism and gender ac-
tivism as only one part of a much larger agenda for environmental,
economic, and social justice”; participants in this movement find it
“counterproductive to isolate gender as a single variable.”190  The re-
lated term “intersectionality” takes a somewhat narrower approach to
antisubordination efforts, focusing on categories of social oppression
other than gender—particularly race—that make oppression as a
problem, and feminism as a solution, different for different groups of
women.191
The contrary view, associated with second-wave feminism, appears
somewhat in retreat.  This position would prefer to leave “environ-
mental, economic, and social justice” to others and consider the inter-
est and position of women only, perhaps on the ground that no other
189. I direct interested readers to the Judge’s monograph on cases involving large numbers of
injured plaintiffs, which explores the progressive potential of numerous federal rules of proce-
dure. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995).
190. Kathleen Kelly Janus, Finding Common Feminist Ground: The Role of the Next Genera-
tion in Shaping Feminist Legal Theory, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 255, 258 (2013) (citing 1
THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT TODAY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THIRD-WAVE FEMINISM 366–67
(Leslie Heywood ed., 2006)).  For an expression of this point by a feminist legal scholar, see
Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 48, 50–51
(1988).
191. The late Trina Grillo spoke powerfully on the point. See Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism
and Intersectionality: Tools To Dismantle the Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 16
(1995).
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social justice movement has made women its priority.192  Second wa-
vers have tried to refute the contention that their version of feminism
comes blinkered with white privilege and racial inattention, with
mixed results.  A more recent challenge for feminists who want to fo-
cus on women only is the definitional question of who is a woman.193
Our protagonist, like everyone else, does not have a design that will
bridge this gap:194  but his feminist jurisprudence made progress on
point using simple inclusion.  He was happily indifferent to fractious
labels.  Recall what Judge Weinstein said about his “ideology”—in his
court, “the individual without the capacity to get her rights gets her
due,”195 and this individual need not go by “her.”  Weinstein’s femi-
nism-beyond-women cases improved the law when they granted relief
to numerous litigants who might not have been women themselves:
children of any gender, male adults with connections to women, and
transgender women whose identity as women was disputed.196  As
other cases discussed in this Article establish, plenty of women re-
ceived relief in Weinstein’s court too. Both, and.197  As third and sec-
ond wavers alike would agree, Judge Weinstein’s energies have
extended justice both to and beyond women.
2. Emotion, Relation, Reason/Liberal-Versus-Cultural Feminism
A second divide in feminist jurisprudence contrasts the “liberal”
version with overlapping alternatives gathered under the rubric of
“cultural” or “relational” feminism.  Liberal feminism stresses the
ways in which women and men are alike; cultural or relational femi-
nism looks at ways in which they are different.  These two flavors are
far from the only varieties of feminism present in feminist legal the-
ory, but they call for separate attention because they are oppositional
as well as constituents of a pluralist mix.
192. See generally Jennifer L. Pozner, The “Big Lie”: False Feminist Death Syndrome, Profit,
and the Media, in CATCHING A WAVE: RECLAIMING FEMINISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 31 (Rory
Dicker & Alison Piepmeier eds., 2003) (arguing that feminism is under continual attack, includ-
ing division into camps and waves, because its message threatens holders of power).
193. See generally CYNTHIA ELLER, AM I A WOMAN? A SKEPTIC’S GUIDE TO GENDER (2004).
194. I tried to find neutral ground on this question in Anita Bernstein, A Feminist Revisit to
the First-Year Curriculum, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 217, 228–29 (1996).
195. See supra note 12.
196. See supra Part II.E.
197. The term “both-and,” commending attention to compatibility rather than exclusion,
helps to describe Judge Weinstein’s capacious mind. See, e.g., RICHARD ROHR, FALLING UP-
WARD: A SPIRITUALITY FOR THE TWO HALVES OF LIFE 10 (2011) (“Mature people are not ei-
ther-or thinkers, but they bathe in the ocean of both-and.”), quoted at Dianna Woolley, Either/
Or—Both/And . . . ., DIANNA WOOLLEY (Feb. 26, 2012, 8:25 PM), http://diannawoolley.com/
blog-notes/2012/2/26/eitheror-bothand.html.
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In his Woman’s Constitution referenced above, Kenneth Karst, not-
ing the work of Carol Gilligan, identified a “web of connection” as
central to relational feminism.198  This metaphor claims that women
“tend to see the same interactions as part of ongoing, sharing connec-
tions in a network of relationships.”199  By contrast, “[m]en tend to
see human interactions as the contractual arrangements of individuals
seeking positions in a hierarchy.”200
Continuing the necessary oversimplification, these two images of
human interactions align in part with relational and liberal feminism
respectively.  They do not align perfectly, to be sure.  Liberals might
well reject my associating the “liberal” kind of feminism with hierar-
chy, even though Karst adverted only to the pursuit of a place within
hierarchy.  And the “web of connection,” like many metaphors, is im-
precise.  Yet the dichotomy is real enough for the Weinsteinian point I
broach here.  Rights, separation, boundaries, precepts lie on one side
of the feminist divide; connection, relationships, and networks of
human beings lie on the other.
The feminist jurisprudence of Jack B. Weinstein partakes of both.
Kramer, for example, exemplifies the ideals of liberal feminism.201
Weinstein respected Faith Kramer’s procedural rights, her entitlement
to forewarning of what the Board of Education could do to her, her
freedom of speech, and her qualifications to craft pedagogy in her
classroom.  Less obviously in this camp—but I would put it there—is
Pulinario, where Judge Weinstein made the  Sixth Amendment right
to counsel effective for a woman, similar to how it has been so effec-
tive for many male defendants.202  At the other side of the divide,
Weinstein’s feminism beyond women found communities and cohorts
to share in his gender-progressive vision.
As for emotion, a topic applied to the decisions of Judge Weinstein
so insightfully in this Symposium by Susan Bandes,203 sentencing deci-
sions present the clearest illustration.204  Above we encountered em-
pathy in several manifestations: downward departures from
198. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
199. KARST, supra note 98, at 462.
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 116–130 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text.
203. Susan A. Bandes, Empathy and Article III: Judge Weinstein, Cases and Controversies, 64
DEPAUL L. REV. 317 (2015).
204. It bears repetition, however, that a famous decision of Judge Weinstein’s outside the
sentencing realm began with a reference to emotion: “The evidence reveals widespread and
unnecessary cruelty by agencies of the City of New York towards mothers abused by their con-
sorts . . . .”  Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); see also supra note
33 and accompanying text.
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Guidelines fiat that reflected the Judge’s compassion about painful bi-
ographical experiences;205 concern for rehabilitation (itself an empa-
thy-based perspective on punishment—no human being wishes to be
thrown away, or judged with only incapacitation in mind);206 and the
nuanced United States v. Blake, where Judge Weinstein paid careful
attention to a victim-impact statement when he sentenced the woman
who had done the victimizing.207  I would add here that Judge Wein-
stein does not assign emotion to female defendants alone.  Emotions
of men and children are also powerfully present in his sentencing
decisions.208
D. Solidarity
Returning here to the divisions between third and second waves
noted above, in an eloquent essay on the subject of unity among
women, bell hooks distinguished between solidarity and sisterhood.
“Sisterhood,” wrote hooks, “[is] based on the idea of common oppres-
sion”209—a troublesome idea because common oppression does not
really unite.  Women experience very different types of oppression,
some harsher or more varied or nuanced than others.  Hooks con-
trasts with “sisterhood” a term she prefers: solidarity, or “political sol-
idarity,” which she deems cogent and central to women’s liberation.210
Some feminists, she wrote, made the mistake of throwing out solidar-
ity when they (rightly) despaired of sisterhood: “We must learn to live
and work in solidarity.”211
Two Weinstein decisions discussed above nicely illustrate the theme
of solidarity.  In an early writing, the employment discrimination
scholar Noah Zatz read Gallagher v. Delaney, which held that a fe-
male worker could bring a Title VII sexual harassment claim when she
205. See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
206. See Amanda Ploch, Note, Why Dignity Matters: Dignity and the Right (or Not) to Reha-
bilitation from International and National Perspectives, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 887, 890
(2012).
207. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Aguilar, 886 F. Supp. 305, 305–06 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (find-
ing that a downward departure was warranted to give the defendant and his wife, who were
struggling with infertility, a chance to have a child), vacated sub nom. United States v. Londono,
76 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1996); MORRIS, supra note 14, at 253 (recalling how Judge Weinstein bought a
defendant’s child a “whole tin of cookies” when he had to sentence her father to 123 months
under the Guidelines and stating that he said, “She doesn’t have a father, maybe at least she
ought to have a tin of cookies”).
209. Bell Hooks, Sisterhood: Political Solidarity Between Women, 23 FEMINIST REV. 126, 127
(1986).  This publication rendered the author’s name with initial capital letters, although she
prefers to use this pen name in all lowercase letters.
210. Id. at 126–29.
211. Id. at 127.
2015] FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 371
found the harassment pervasive even though she was not a direct vic-
tim of the offending conduct, as recounting an encounter with “inter-
group solidarity” that courts can recognize when they construe Title
VII.212  In Nicholson v. Williams, Judge Weinstein certified a class of
welfare mothers who gained the benefit of his decision allowing them,
as victims of domestic violence, to keep their children.213  Certification
of female-dominated classes toward progressive ends, a topic bur-
geoning in the law reviews especially after the feminist loss of Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, provides a route to court for women other-
wise unavailable to get there.214  Class certification was not as neces-
sary for Sharwline Nicholson as Betty Dukes, but it boosted an
important challenge with the strength of aggregation.215
IV. CONCLUSION
Imagine a nominee to fill a vacancy on the federal trial bench—a
fictitious person, not the honoree of this Symposium.  He arrives at his
confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee.  A
drowsy senator asks him something vague about his philosophy of
judging and what he thinks the judiciary is tasked to do.216  Other
nominees have in the past responded to the question with bland eva-
sion.  Their pattern is exemplified by the answer of John Roberts, who
when nominated to be Chief Justice of the United States defined his
judicial role as calling “balls and strikes” in the quotidian mode of a
humble home plate umpire.217 Our nominee, let us suppose, takes a
different tack.  He tells the questioning senator that he wants to insert
feminist jurisprudence into the Federal Supplement. Tant pis for his
Article III prospects.
212. Zatz, supra note 84, at 69.
213. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
214. See generally Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion,
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (2011).
215. The class certification decision, Nicholson v. Williams, 202 F.R.D. 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2001),
carefully certified two classes: Class A, consisting of adults subjected to domestic violence, and
Class B, consisting of children living in the custody of Class A members. Id. at 380.  Because the
relief sought in Nicholson was injunctive rather than pecuniary, certifying Class A made it more
likely that these custodial mothers would receive the benefit of the injunction.  I thank Liz
Schneider and Jacob Corre´ for their helpful reflections on the consequences of class certification
in this decision.
216. On blandness, see William Ross, The Questioning of Lower Federal Court Nominees at
Senate Confirmation Hearings, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 119, 135 (2001) (observing that oral
questions of these nominees by senators “too often are superficial and encourage rote
responses”).
217. See Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, Liberal Reading: Taking Back the Constitution,
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 6, 2007, at 14, 15.
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Jack B. Weinstein gave no such response to any senatorial question-
ers back in 1967.  He had no such agenda; he was not withholding
information about his plans.  Unlike our hypothetical alternative nom-
inee, he could be confirmed.  Also unlike this alternative nominee,
Judge Weinstein was able to achieve the ends that have occupied this
Article.
Over the decades of an extraordinary judicial career, feminist juris-
prudence for this judge has amounted to doing the right thing.  Judge
Weinstein serves the individuals who come before him in his court
while at the same time upholding the rule of law.  His words are worth
quoting again: “The ideology?  The ideology is the individual without
the capacity to get her rights gets her due.”218  From this simple start-
ing point, feminist jurisprudence has followed.
218. See supra note 12.
